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Abstract
Experimental evidence of the last decades has made the status of
“collapses of the wave function” even more shaky than it already was
on conceptual grounds: interference effects turn out to be detectable
even when collapses are typically expected to occur. Non-collapse in-
terpretations should consequently be taken seriously. In this paper we
argue that such interpretations suggest a perspectivalism according to
which quantum objects are not characterized by monadic properties,
but by relations to other systems. Accordingly, physical systems may
possess different properties with respect to different “reference sys-
tems”. We discuss some of the relevant arguments, and argue that
perspectivalism both evades recent arguments that single-world inter-
pretations are inconsistent and eliminates the need for a privileged
rest frame in the relativistic case.
1 Introduction: early hints of non-collapse
and perspectivalism
In introductions to quantum mechanics it is standard to introduce “collapses
of the wave function” in order to avoid the occurrence of superpositions of
states associated with different macroscopic properties. The paradigm case
is the quantum mechanical treatment of measurement: if the interaction be-
tween a quantum system and a measuring device is described by means of
unitary Schro¨dinger evolution, the composite system of object plus device
will generally end up in an entangled state that is not an eigenstate of the
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measured observable, but rather a superposition of such states. But suc-
cessful measurements end with the realization of exactly one of the possible
outcomes, so it appears plausible that at some stage during the measurement
interaction unitary evolution is suspended and a collapse to one of the terms
in the superposition takes place.
However, experimental research of the last decades has undermined this
motivation for the introduction of collapses. “Schro¨dinger cat states”, i.e.
superpositions of distinguishable quantum states of mesoscopic or even prac-
tically macroscopic physical systems are now routinely prepared in the lab-
oratory, and interference between the different terms in the superpositions
have abundantly been verified (see e.g. [22] for a sample of recent develop-
ments). This lends inductive support to the hypothesis that superpositions
never really collapse, but are merely difficult to detect in everyday situa-
tions. In such situations huge numbers of environmental degrees of freedom
come into play, so that the mechanism of decoherence may be invoked as an
explanation for the practical unobservability of interference between macro-
scopically different states under standard conditions. This line of thought
leads in the direction of non-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics.
The evidence against collapses has not yet affected the textbook tradition,
which has not questioned the status of collapses as a mechanism of evolu-
tion alongside unitary Schro¨dinger dynamics. However, the relevant views
of the pioneers of quantum mechanics were not at all clear-cut. The locus
classicus for the introduction and discussion of collapses is chapter 6 of Von
Neumann’s 1932 Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics [34]. In
this chapter Von Neumann underlines the fundamental difference between
collapses—occurring in measurements—and unitary evolution, but connects
this difference to the distinction between on the one hand the experience of
an observer and on the other hand external descriptions (in which the ob-
server is treated in the same way as the other physical systems involved in
the measurement interaction). In the external description Von Neumann as-
sumes unitary evolution, with superpositions (also involving the observer) as
an inevitable consequence. Nevertheless, Von Neumann states, the content
of the observer’s “subjective experience” corresponds to only one single term
in the superposition.
So the distinction between collapses and unitary evolution for Von Neu-
mann is not a distinction between two competing and potentially conflicting
physical interaction mechanisms on the same level of description, but rather
concerns what can be said in relation to two different points of view—an idea
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taken up and developed by London and Bauer (see below).
Also Niels Bohr took the position that the standard rules of quantum me-
chanics apply even to measuring devices and other macroscopic objects, so
that strictly speaking these cannot be characterized by sets of precise values
of classical quantities (even though folklore has it that Bohr assumed that
quantum mechanics does not apply to the macroscopic world, see [13] for an
extensive discussion). Thus, in 1935 Bohr wrote [6] that “a purely classical
account of the measuring apparatus still implies the necessity of latitudes
corresponding to the uncertainty relations. If spatial dimensions and time
intervals are sufficiently large, this involves no limitation.” And in 1948 [7] he
commented in the same vein: “we may to a very high degree of approxima-
tion disregard the quantum character of the measuring instruments if they
are sufficiently heavy.” Although for Bohr there is thus no difference of prin-
ciple between macro and micro objects, he does assign a special role to the
observer and to the “conditions of measurement” (the specific experimental
set-up, chosen by the observer). However, he does not acknowledge a sui
generis measurement dynamics but rather refers to the specific epistemolog-
ical vantage point of the observer, who can only communicate what he finds
by using definite values of classical quantities (the paradigm case being the
assignment of a definite value of either position or momentum, depending on
the chosen kind of measuring device).
According to Bohr, the object that is being measured and the measuring
device form in each individual case one insoluble whole, so that “an inde-
pendent reality in the ordinary physical sense can not be ascribed to the
phenomena” [5]. The properties of a quantum system according to Bohr
only become well-defined in the context of the system’s coupling to a mea-
suring device—which points in the direction of a relational nature of physical
properties.
A more formal analysis of quantum measurements, close to Von Neu-
mann’s account, was given by London and Bauer in their 1939 booklet on
the Theory of Observation in Quantum Mechanics [27]. London and Bauer
consider three interacting systems: x, the object system, y, a measuring
device, and z, the observer. As a result of the unitary evolution of the
combined object–device system, an entangled state will result: Σkck|x〉k|y〉k.
When the observer reads off the result of the measurement, a similar unitary
evolution of the x,y, z system takes place, so that the final state becomes:
|Ψ〉 = Σkck|x〉k|y〉k|z〉k. London and Bauer comment [27, pp. 41–42]:
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“Objectively”—that is, for us who consider as “object” the com-
bined system x,y, z—the situation seems little changed compared
to what we just met when we were only considering apparatus and
object. ... The observer has a completely different viewpoint: for
him it is only the object x and the apparatus y which belong to
the external world, to that what he calls “objective”. By contrast,
he has with himself relations of a very special character: he has at
his disposal a characteristic and quite familiar faculty which we
can call the “faculty of introspection.” For he can immediately
give an account of his own state. By virtue of this “immanent
knowledge” he attributes to himself the right to create his own
objectivity, namely, to cut the chain of statistical correlations ex-
pressed by Σkck|x〉k|y〉k|z〉k by stating “I am in the state |z〉k”,
or more simply “I see yk” or even directly “X = yk”
1.
It is clear from this quote and the further context that London and Bauer
believed that there is a role for human consciousness in bringing about a def-
inite measurement outcome—even though they also assumed, like von Neu-
mann, that “from the outside” the observer, including his consciousness, can
be described in a physicalist way, by unitary quantum evolution (cf. [21,
sect. 11.3]). The appeal to consciousness can hardly be considered satisfac-
tory, though: it appears to invoke a deus ex machina, devised for the express
purpose of reconciling unitary evolution with definite measurement results.
More generally, the hypothesis that the definiteness of the physical world
only arises as the result of the intervention of (human?) consciousness does
not sit well with the method of physics.
Although certain elements of London’s and Bauer’s solution are there-
fore hard to accept, the suggestion that it should somehow be possible to
reconcile universal unitary evolution, and the resulting omnipresence of en-
tangled states, with the occurrence of definite values of physical quantities
appears plausible. Indeed, the theoretical framework of quantum mechanics
itself2 does not in a natural way leave room for another dynamical process
beside unitary evolution; e.g., there is no time scale or scale of complex-
ity at which this alternative evolution could set in. As already mentioned,
empirical results support this verdict. Accordingly, in the next sections we
shall investigate whether the early intuitions about the universality of uni-
1Here X stand for the observable whose value is measured by the apparatus.
2As opposed to modifications of the quantum formalism, as in the GRW-theory.
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tary evolution, excluding collapse as a dynamical process, can be salvaged
in a purely physicalist way. We shall argue that “perspectival” non-collapse
interpretations capture the intuitions behind the London and Bauer and Von
Neumann analyses, without an appeal to consciousness or human observers.
2 Relational Aspects of Non-Collapse Inter-
pretations
The common feature of non-collapse interpretations is that they single out
unitary evolution (Schro¨dinger evolution or one of its relativistic generaliza-
tions) as the only way that quantum states develop in time. Consequently,
entangled quantum states generally develop as a result of interactions, even
with macroscopic objects like measuring devices. Of course, the task is to
reconcile this with the definite states of affairs encountered in experience.
There are several proposals for such a reconciliation. The best-known
one is probably the many-worlds interpretation, according to which each
individual term in a superposition that results from a measurement-like in-
teraction represents an actual state of affairs, characterized by definite values
of some set of observables. In this approach there are many actual states of
affairs, worlds or “branches”, living together in a “super-universe”. The ex-
perience of any individual observer is restricted to one single branch within
this super-universe. In other words, the experienced world is the part of the
super-universe that is accessible from the observer’s perspective (a relational
aspect of the scheme, which is the reason that Everett first introduced it as
the “relative state” formulation of quantum mechanics [15]).
A second category of interpretations, modal interpretations, holds that
there is only one actual reality, so that all except one of the “branches”of the
total entangled state do not correspond to actual worlds but rather to unre-
alized possibilities—“modalities”. Some of these modal interpretations make
the assumption that there is one a priori preferred observable (or set of com-
muting observables) that is always definite-valued in each physical system,
others assume that the set of definite-valued quantities depends on the form
of the quantum state and can therefore change over time (see [8, 14, 26] for
overviews). In the first category belong the Bohm interpretation, in which
position is always definite, and the “Hamiltonian modal interpretation” [25]
according to which energy plays a privileged role. An example of the sec-
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ond category is the proposal according to which the bi-orthogonal (Schmidt)
decomposition of the total state determines the definite quantities of par-
tial systems (namely, the quantities represented by the projection operators
projecting on the basis vectors that diagonalize the partial system’s den-
sity matrix [33]); another proposal is to make decoherence responsible for
the selection of definite quantities, in the same way as is now standard in
many-worlds accounts.
Other non-collapse approaches are the consistent-histories interpretation
[20] and Rovelli’s relational interpretation [30, 23]. Interestingly, the latter
interpretation posits from the outset that the dynamical properties of any
physical system are purely relational and only become definite with respect
to some other system when an interaction between the two systems (in the
formalism described by unitary quantum evolution) correlates the systems
(so that there is an “exchange of information” between them).
However, relational features also have a natural place in most of the other
just-mentioned non-collapse interpretations (although not in all of them), as
can be illustrated by further considering the situation discussed by London
and Bauer (section 1)—which essentially is the well-known “Wigner’s friend”
thought experiment.
Suppose that an experimentalist (our friend, who is a perfect observer)
performs a quantum measurement within a hermetically sealed room. Let
us say that the spin of a spin-1/2 particle is measured in a previously fixed
direction, and that the experimentalist notes the outcome (either +1/2 or
−1/2). After some time we, who are outside the room, will be sure that the
experiment is over and that our friend will have observed a definite result.
Yet, we possess no certainty about the outcome. In a classical context we
would therefore represent the state of the room and its contents by an ig-
norance mixture over states: there are two possibilities (“up” and “down”),
both with probability 1/2.
But in unitary quantum mechanics the situation is different in an impor-
tant respect. According to the Von Neumann measurement scheme, the final
situation of the room after the experiment, including a record of the friend’s
observation, will be given by a linear superposition of terms, each containing
a definite spin state of the particle coupled to a state of our experimentalist in
which he is aware of his found spin value. For us outside, this superposition
is the correct theoretical description of the room and its contents; and this
(coherent) superposition is different from an (incoherent) ignorance mixture
over different possible states. As mentioned in the previous section, expe-
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rience supports the ascription of this superposed state: experiments with
Schro¨dinger cat states demonstrate that we need the superposition to do jus-
tice to the experimental facts. For example, if we are going to measure the
projection operator |Ψ〉〈Ψ| (where |Ψ〉 stands for the superposed state of the
room and its contents), the formalism tells us that we shall find the result
“1” with certainty; this is different from what a mixed state would predict.
Experiment confirms predictions of this kind.
However, we also possess robust experience about what happens when we
watch an experiment inside a closed laboratory room: there will be a definite
outcome. Therefore, it seems inevitable to accept that during the experiment
our friend becomes aware of exactly one spin value. As stated by London and
Bauer, our friend will be justified in saying either “the spin is up” or “the
spin is down” after the experiment. The dilemma is that we, on the outside,
can only derive an “improper mixture” as a state for the particle spin, and
that well-known arguments forbid us to think that this mixture represents
our ignorance about the actually realized spin-eigenstate (indeed, if the spin
state actually was one of the up or down eigenstates, it would follow that
the total system of room and its contents had to be an ignorance mixture
as well, which conflicts with the premise—supported both theoretically and
empirically—that the total state is a superposition).
Our proposed perspectival way out of this dilemma is to ascribe more
than one state to the same physical system. In the case under discussion,
with respect to us, representing the outside point of view, the contents of the
laboratory room are correctly described by an entangled pure state so that
we should ascribe improper mixtures (obtained by “partial tracing”) to the
inside observer, the measuring device and the spin particle. But with respect
to the inside observer (or with respect to the measuring device in the room)
the particle spin is definite-valued. So the inside observer should assign a
state to his environment that appropriately reflects this definiteness.
This line of thought leads to the idea of assigning relational or perspecti-
val states, i.e. states of a physical system A from the perspective of a physical
system B. This step creates room for the possibility that the state and phys-
ical properties of a system A are different in relation to different “reference
systems” B. As suggested by the examples, this move may make it possible
to reconcile the unitary evolution during a quantum measurement with the
occurrence of definite outcomes. The properties associated with the super-
position and the definite outcomes, respectively, would relate to two differ-
ent perspectives—the idea already suggested by Von Neumann and London
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and Bauer. Of course, we should avoid the earlier problems associated with
consciousness and ill-defined transitions. The different perspectives, and dif-
ferent relational states, should therefore be defined in purely physical terms.
The idea as just formulated was tentative: we spoke in a loose way
of “states”, thinking of wave functions (or vectors in Hilbert space) with-
out specifying what the attribution of quantum states to physical systems
means on the level of physical quantities, i.e. in terms of physical properties
of the systems concerned. In fact, this physical meaning is interpretation-
dependent.
In the many-worlds interpretation the perspectival character of quantum
states, for the Wigner’s Friend type of scenario that we just discussed, trans-
lates into the following physical account. When the measurement interactions
within the hermetically sealed room have completely ended, the contents in
the room have split into two copies: one in which the outcome +1/2 has
been realized and observed, and one with the outcome −1/2. However, we
as external observers can still verify the superposed state by measuring an
observable like |Ψ〉〈Ψ|, so that for us the two “worlds” inside the room still
form one whole. Apparently, the splitting (branching) of worlds that happens
in measurements cannot be a global process, extending over the whole uni-
verse at once, but must be a local splitting that propagates with the further
physical interactions that take place (cf. [2]). Therefore, although we know
(if we reason in terms of the many-worlds interpretation) that there are two
copies of our friend inside, each having observed one particular outcome, we
still consider the room plus its contents as represented by the coherent super-
position that corresponds to the definite value “1” of the physical quantity
represented by the observable |Ψ〉〈Ψ|. So here we encounter a perspectival-
ism on the level of physical properties: there exists a definite spin value for
the internal observer, but not for his external colleague.
The same type of story can be told in those modal interpretations in
which the definite-valued physical properties of systems are defined by their
quantum states (one detailed proposal for how to define physical properties
from the quantum state can be found in [3, 12]). The main difference with
the many-worlds account is that now the interactions within the room do not
lead to two worlds but to only one, with either spin up or spin down. Also in
this case, there is a definite spin value for the internal observer whereas from
the outside it is rather the observable |Ψ〉〈Ψ| (and observables commuting
with it) that is definite-valued, which conflicts with the attribution of a value
to the spin—even though outside observers may know that for their inside
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counterpart there is such a value.
Rovelli’s relational interpretation, which takes part of its inspiration from
Heisenberg’s heuristics in the early days of quantum mechanics, says that a
quantity of system B only becomes definite for A when an interaction (a
measurement) occurs between A and B [30]. In our Wigner’s friend scenario,
this again leads to the verdict that the internal interactions in the laboratory
room lead to a situation in which the spin is definite with respect to an
internal observer, but not for an external one. Only when (and if) external
observers enter the room and interact with the spin system, does the spin
become definite for them as well.
In all these cases we obtain accounts that are similar to the London and
Bauer analysis, but with the important distinction that non-physical features
do not enter the story. It should be noted that the relational properties
introduced here are intended to possess an ontological status: it is not the
case that for an outside observer the internal spin values are definite but
unknown. The proposal is that the spin really is indeterminate with respect
to the world outside the laboratory room.
This perspectivalism with respect to properties does not seem an in-
evitable feature of all non-collapse interpretations, however. In particular,
those interpretations of quantum mechanics in which it is assumed that there
exists an a priori given set of preferred observables that is always definite—in
all physical systems, at all times and in all circumstances—are by construc-
tion at odds with the introduction of a definiteness that is merely relative.
The Bohm interpretation is a case in point. According to this interpretation
all physical systems are composed of particles that always possess a definite
position, as a monadic attribute independent of any perspective. So in our
sealed room experiment the instantaneous situation inside is characterized
by the positions of all particles in the room, and this description is also
valid with respect to the outside world—even though an outside observer
will usually lack information about the exact values of the positions. So for
an external observer there exists one definite outcome of the experiment in-
side, corresponding to one definite particle configuration. The outcome of
any measurement on the room as a whole that the outside observer might
perform again corresponds to a definite configuration of particles with well-
defined positions. The fact that this value is not what we would classically
expect (for example, when we measure |Ψ〉〈Ψ|) is explained by the Bohm
theory via the non-classical measurement interaction between the external
observer’s measuring device and the room. The quantum states that in per-
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spectival schemes encode information about which physical properties are
definite, in the Bohm types of interpretations only play a role in the dynam-
ics of a fixed set of quantities, so that the possibility of relational properties
or perspectivalism does not suggest itself.
However, it has recently been argued that all interpretations of this uni-
tary kind, characterized by definite and unique outcomes at the end of each
successful experiment even though the total quantum state always evolves
unitarily, cannot be consistent [18, 1, 9]. This argument is relevant for our
theme, and we shall discuss it in some detail.
3 Unitarity and Consistency
In a recent paper [18] Frauchiger and Renner consider a sophisticated version
of the Wigner’s friend experiment in which there are two friends, each in their
own room, with a private information channel between them. Outside the
two rooms are Wigner and an Assistant. The experiment consists of a series
of four measurements, performed by the individual friends, and then by the
Assistant and Wigner, respectively. In the room of Friend 1 a quantum coin
has been prepared in a superposition of “heads” and “tails”: 1√
3
|h〉+
√
2
3
|t〉.
The experiment starts when Friend 1 measures her coin, and finds either
heads (probability 1/3) or tails (probability 2/3). Friend 1 then prepares
a qubit in the state |0〉 if her outcome is h, and in the state 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉)
if her outcome is t, and sends the qubit via the private channel between
the rooms to Friend 2. When Friend 2 receives the qubit, he subjects it to
a measurement of an observable that has the eigenstates |0〉 and |1〉. As
in the thought experiment of section 2, the external observers subsequently
measure “global” observables on the respective rooms; this is first done by
the Assistant (on the room of Friend 1), and then by Wigner (on the room
of Friend 2).
Frauchiger and Renner claim, via a rather complicated line of reasoning3,
that any interpretation of quantum mechanics that assigns unique outcomes
to these meaurements “in one single world”, while using only unitary evolu-
tion for the dynamics of the quantum state (also during the measurements),
will lead to an inconsistent assignment of values to the measurement out-
3M. Arau´jo has given a concise version of the argument [1], which makes the ideas
clearer.
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comes. If this conclusion is correct, there are significant implications for the
question of which unitary interpretations of quantum mechanics are possi-
ble. The theories that are excluded according to Frauchiger and Renner are
theories that “rule out the occurrence of more than one single outcome if an
experimenter measures a system once” [18, p. 2]. If this were right, accepting
many worlds would seem inevitable. In fact, Frauchiger and Renner them-
selves conclude that “the result proved here forces us to reject a single-world
description of physical reality” [18, p. 3].
However, we should not be too quick when we interprete this statement.
As Frauchiger and Renner make clear, they use their “single-world assump-
tion” to ensure that all measurement outcomes are context-independent. In
particular, what they use in their proof is a compatibility condition between
different “stories” of a measurement: if one experimenter’s story is that an ex-
periment has outcome t, this should entail that in every other experimenter’s
story of the same event this same outcome t also figures [18, p. 7]. This is
first of all a denial of the possibility of perspectivalism. As we shall further
discuss in a moment, perspectival interpretations will be able to escape the
conclusion of the F-R argument. Therefore, what we are going to claim is
that the F-R argument can be taken to lend support to perspectivalism, as
one of the remaining consistent possibilities.
The details, and domain of validity, of the F-R proof are not completely
transparent and uncontroversial. Indeed, there is at least one non-perspectival
single-world interpretation, namely the Bohm interpretation, whose consis-
tency is usually taken for granted. This consistency is confirmed by a result
of Sudbery [32], who has concretely constructed a series of outcomes for
the F-R thought experiment as predicted by a modal interpretation of the
Bohm type. According to Sudbery there is an unjustified step in Frauchiger’s
and Renner’s reasoning, because they do not fully take into account that in
unitary interpretations only the total (non-collapsed) state can be used for
predicting the probabilities of results obtained by the Assistant and Wigner4.
4The bone of contention is statement 4 in Arau´o’s reconstruction of the F-R inconsis-
tency [1, p. 4], in which Friend 1 argues that his coin measurement result is only compatible
with one single later result to be obtained by Wigner in the final measurement. But in
unitary interpretations previous measurement results do not always play a role in the com-
putation of probabilities for future events. Indeed, a calculation on the basis of the total
uncollapsed quantum state as given on p. 4 of [1] indicates that Wigner may find either
one of two possible outcomes, with equal probabilities, even given the previous result of
Friend 1—this contradicts the assumption made by Frauchiger and Renner.
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The situation becomes much less opaque when we make use of an elegant
version of the F-R thought experiment recently proposed by Bub [9]. Bub
replaces Friend 1 by Alice and Friend 2 by Bob; Alice and Bob find themselves
at a great distance from each other. Alice has a quantum coin which she
subjects to a measurement of the observable A with eigenstates |h〉A, |t〉A;
as before, the coin has been prepared in the initial state 1√
3
|h〉A +
√
2
3
|t〉A.
Alice then prepares a qubit in the state |0〉B if her outcome is h, and in the
state 1√
2
(|0〉B + |1〉B) if her outcome is t. She subsequently sends this qubit
to Bob—this is the only “interaction” between Alice and Bob. After Bob
has received the qubit, he subjects it to a measurement of the observable B
with eigenstates |0〉B, |1〉B.
In accordance with the philosophy of non-collapse interpretations, we
assume that Alice and Bob obtain definite outcomes for their measurements,
but that the total system of Alice, Bob, their devices and environments,
and the coin and the qubit can nevertheless be described by the uncollapsed
quantum state, namely:
|Ψ〉 = 1√
3
(|h〉A|0〉B + |t〉A|0〉B + |t〉A|1〉B). (1)
For ease of notation the quantum states of Alice and Bob themselves, plus
the measuring devices used by them, and even the states of the environments
that have become correlated to them, have here all been included in the states
|h〉A, |t〉A, |0〉B) and |1〉B (so that these states no longer simply refer to the
coin and the qubit, respectively, but to extremely complicated many-particles
systems!).
Now we consider two external observers, also at a very great distance from
each other, who take over the roles of Wigner and his assistant, and are going
to perform measurements on Alice and Bob (and their entire experimental
set-ups), respectively. The external observer who focuses on Alice measures
an observable X with eigenstates |fail〉A = 1√
2
(|h〉A + |t〉A) and |ok〉A =
1√
2
(|h〉A − |t〉A), and the observer dealing with Bob and Bob’s entire exper-
iment measures the observable Y with eigenstates |fail〉B = 1√
2
(|0〉B + |1〉B)
and |ok〉B = 1√
2
(|0〉B − |1〉B).
A F-R contradiction now arises in the following manner [9, p. 3]. The
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state |Ψ〉 can alternatively be expressed as:
|Ψ〉 = 1√
12
|ok〉A|ok〉B − 1√
12
|ok〉A|fail〉B
+
1√
12
|fail〉A|ok〉B +
√
3
4
|fail〉A|fail〉B (2)
=
√
2
3
|fail〉A|0〉B + 1√
3
|t〉A|1〉B (3)
=
1√
3
|h〉A|0〉B +
√
2
3
|t〉A|fail〉B (4)
From Eq. 2, we see that the outcome {ok, ok} in a joint measurement of
X and Y has a non-zero probability: this outcome will be realized in roughly
1/12-th of all cases if the experiments are repeated many times. From Eq.
3 we calculate that the pair {ok, 0} has zero probability as a measurement
outcome, so {ok, 1} is the only possible pair of values for the observables
X,B in the cases in which X has the value ok. However, from Eq. 4 we
conclude that the pair {t, ok} has zero probability, so h is the only possible
value for the observable A if Y has the value ok and A and Y are measured
together. So this would apparently lead to the pair of values {h, 1} as the
only possibility for the observables A and B, if X and Y are jointly measured
with the result {ok, ok}. But this pair of values has zero probability in the
state |Ψ〉, so it is not a possible pair of measurement outcomes for Alice and
Bob in that state. So although the outcome {ok, ok} forX and Y is certainly
possible, the (seemingly) necessarily associated outcome {h, 1} for A and B
is not—this is an inconsistency.
In this inconsistency argument there is a silent use of the F-R non-
perspectivalism condition. For example, it is assumed that if Bob’s mea-
surement outcome is 1 from the perspective of the X measurement, this
outcome has also to be 1 as judged from the perspective of the Y observer.
But it is not evident that this assumption sits well with the quantum for-
mulas: for example, the relative state of Bob with respect to the Y outcome
“ok” is not |1〉B, but |ok〉B (cf. Eq. 5 below), and it is not immediately clear
that before the Y measurement it had to be 1.
To see in more detail what is wrong with the inconsistency argument
from a viewpoint that closely follows the quantum formalism, it is helpful
to note that the states (1), (2), (3) and (4) are all states of Alice and Bob,
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including their devices and environments, but without the external observers.
In a consistent non-collapse interpretation we must also include the external
observer states in the total state if we want to discuss the measurements of
the observables X and Y . If we denote by |o〉 and |f〉 the external states
corresponding to the measurement results “ok” and “fail”, respectively, we
find for the final state, in obvious notation:
1√
12
|ok〉A|ok〉B|o〉X |o〉Y − 1√
12
|ok〉A|fail〉B|o〉X |f〉Y
+
1√
12
|fail〉A|ok〉B|f〉X |o〉Y +
√
3
4
|fail〉A|fail〉B|f〉X |f〉Y . (5)
From the counterpart of this equation that applies when only X or only Y is
measured, we read off that the relative state of Alice and Bob with respect
to Alice’s external observer in state |o〉X is |ok〉A|1〉B; with respect to Bob’s
external observer in state |o〉Y it is |h〉A|ok〉B (in both cases only one external
measurement is considered to take place, either X or Y ). These results are
in accordance with what was stated in the above “inconsistency argument”.
However, from Eq. 5 the state of Alice and Bob relative to the combined
external observers state |o〉X |o〉Y is:
|ok〉A|ok〉B = 1
2
(|h〉A − |t〉A)(|0〉B − |1〉B). (6)
This is an entangled state in which neither the coin toss nor the qubit mea-
surement has a definite result—it is not the state |h〉|1〉 that was argued to
be present in Bub’s version of the F-R argument. This illustrates the fact
that in the case of an entangled state between two systems, the perspectives
of an external observer who measures one system and the observer who mea-
sures the other can generally not be glued together to give us the perspective
of the system that consists of both observers. In fact, as we see from Eq.
5, in the final quantum state not only Alice and Bob, but also the external
observers have become entangled with each other—this should already make
us suspicious of combining partial viewpoints into a whole, as it is well known
that entanglement may entail non-classical holistic features.
So perspectival views, which make the assignment of properties dependent
on the relative quantum state, are able to escape the above inconsistency
argument by denying that the X-perspective and the Y -perspective can be
simply juxtaposed to form the XY -perspective.
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A further point to note is that the quantities measured by the external
observers do not commute with A and B, respectively. So the measurement
by the observer near to Alice introduces a “context” that is different from
that of Alice’s A-measurement, and similarly for the Y and B measurements.
This makes it understandable that the combined final XY perspective need
not agree with the measurement outcomes initially found by Alice and Bob
[17]. Indeed, the correct “Alice and Bob state” from the XY -perspective,
given by Eq. 6, does not show one definite combination of results of Alice’s
A and Bob’s B measurement but contains all of them as possibilities.
The Frauchiger and Renner argument, in Bub’s formulation, therefore
does not threaten perspectival one-world interpretations with unitary dy-
namics. But we should wonder whether non-perspectival unitary schemes,
like the Bohm theory, will also be able to escape inconsistency; and if so,
exactly how they do so. When we again follow the measurement steps in the
thought experiment, we are allowed to conclude that the X result “ok” can
only be found if Bob had measured “1”. In the context of the Bohm inter-
pretation this means that after the first external measurement the particle
configuration ofX is at a point of configuration space that is compatible with
the state |o〉X only if Bob’s configuration is in a part of configuration space
compatible with |1〉B. The same conclusion can be drawn with respect to Y
and A for a measurement series in which Y is measured before X : if the Y
measurement is performed first and the result “ok” is registered, A must have
seen “heads”. Now, X and Y are at space-like separation from each other,
and this seems to imply that it cannot make a difference to the initial state
of Alice and Bob what the order in time is of the X and Y measurements.
If the X measurement is the earlier one, Bob must have been in state |1〉B;
if Y is measured first, Alice was in state |h〉A. Therefore, if the time order
is immaterial, Alice and Bob together were initially with certainty in the
state {h, 1}, if the X, Y measurements ended with the result {ok, ok}. But
this is in contradiction with what the unitary formalism predicts: inspection
of the initial state (Eq. (1)) shows that the outcome combination {h, 1} is
impossible. So we have an inconsistency, and the Bohm interpretation, and
other non-perspectival unitary interpretations, seem to be in trouble.
However, in the Bohm theory the existence of a preferred reference frame
that defines a universal time is assumed to exist (see for more on the justi-
fication of this assumption section 4). This makes it possible to discuss the
stages of the experiment in their objectively correct temporal order. Assume
that after Alice’s and Bob’s “in-the-room” measurements (the first by Alice,
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the second by Bob), the external observer near to Alice measures first, after
which the observer close to Bob performs the second measurement. The first
external measurement will disturb the configuration of particles making up
Alice and her environment, so Alice’s initial result will be changed. If the
result of the X measurement is “ok”, Bob’s internal result must be 1 (Bob
is far away, but the possibility of this inference is not strange, because the
total state is entangled, which entails correlations between Alice and Bob).
This 1 will remain unchanged until the second external measurement, of Y .
This second measurement will change Bob’s state. Now, in this story it is
not true that the outcome “ok” of Y is only compatible with Alice’s outcome
“heads”, as used in the inconsistency argument: the previous measurement
of X has blocked this conclusion. In fact, the initial outcome combination
{t, 1} will lead to the later results {ok, ok} with probability 1/4, and since
{t, 1} itself has probability 1/3 in the initial state this leads to the correct
probability of 1/12 of {ok, ok}. So there is a fully consistent story here, in
which Alice’s result is t.
So also Bohm and possibly other non-perspectival schemes are able to
escape the inconsistency argument. In the perspectival schemes the key was
that two perspectives cannot always be simply combined into one global per-
spective; because of this, we were allowed to speak about the X perspective
and the Y perspective without specifying the temporal order of the X and
Y measurements. The threat of inconsistency was avoided by blocking the
composition of the two perspectives into one whole. In the non-perspectival
scheme the existence of a preferred frame of reference comes to the rescue
and protects us against inconsistency: we can follow the interactions and the
changes produced by them step by step in their unique real time order, so
that no ambiguity arises about which measurement comes first and about
what the actual configuration is at each instant. The issue of combining de-
scriptions from different perspectives accordingly does not arise, and this is
enough to tell one consistent story.
The difference between the perspectival and non-perspectival unitary ac-
counts, and the apparent connection between perspectivalism and Lorentz
invariance, suggests that there is a link between perspectivalism and relativ-
ity. Perspectivalism seems able to avoid inconsistencies without introducing
a privileged frame of reference. On the other hand, the introduction of such
a privileged frame in Bohm-like interpretations now appears as a ploy to
eliminate the threat of inconsistencies without adopting perspectivalism.
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4 Relativity
The diagnosis of the previous section is confirmed when we directly study
the consequences of relativity for interpretations of quantum mechanics. In
particular, when we attempt to combine special relativity with unitary in-
terpretational schemes, new hints of perspectivalism emerge. As mentioned,
the Bohm interpretation has difficulties in accommodating Lorentz invari-
ance. Bohmians have therefore generally accepted the existence of a pre-
ferred inertial frame in which the equations assume their standard form—a
frame resembling the ether frame of prerelativistic electrodynamics. Accept-
ing such a privileged frame in the context of what we know about special
relativity and Minkowski spacetime is of course not something to be done
lightly; it must be a response to a problem of principle. Indeed, it can be
mathematically proved that no unitary interpretation scheme that attributes
always definite positions to particles (as in the Bohm theory) can satisfy the
requirement that the same probability rules apply equally to all hyperplanes
in Minkowski spacetime [4].
The idea of this theorem (and of similar proofs) is that intersecting hy-
perplanes should carry properties and probabilities in a coherent way, which
means that they should give agreeing verdicts about the physical conditions
at the spacetime points where they (the hyperplanes) intersect. The proofs
demonstrate that this meshing of hyperplanes is impossible to achieve with
properties that are hyperplane independent. The no-go results can be gener-
alized to encompass non-perspectival unitary interpretations that attribute
other definite properties than position, and to unitary interpretations that
work with sets of properties that change in time [10]. A general proof along
these lines was given by Myrvold [28]. Myrvold shows, for the case of two
systems that are (approximately) localized during some time interval, that
it is impossible to have a joint probability distribution of definite properties
along four intersecting hyperplanes such that this joint distribution returns
the Born probabilities on each hyperplane. An essential assumption in the
proof [28, p. 1777] is that the properties of the considered systems are what
Myrvold calls local : the value of quantity A of system S at spacetime point p
(a point lying on more than one hyperplanes) must be well defined regardless
of the hyperplane to which p is taken to belong and regardless of which other
systems are present in the universe. It turns out that such local properties
cannot obey the Born probability rule on each and every hyperplane. The
assumption that the Born rule only holds in a preferred frame of reference is
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one way of responding to this no-go result.
The argument has been given a new twist by Leegwater [24], who argues
that “unitary single-outcome quantum mechanics” cannot be “relativistic”,
where a theory is called relativistic if all inertial systems have the same status
with respect to the formulation of the dynamic equations of the theory (i.e.,
what usually is called Lorentz or relativistic invariance). Like Frauchiger and
Renner, Leegwater considers a variation on the Wigner’s friend thought ex-
periment: there are three laboratory rooms, at spacelike distances from each
other, each with a friend inside and a Wigner-like observer outside. In each
of the lab rooms there is also a spin-1/2 particle, and the experiment starts
in a state in which the three particles (one in each room) have been prepared
in a so-called GHZ-state [19]. The description of the thought experiment
in an initially chosen inertial rest frame is assumed to be as follows: at a
certain instant the three friends inside their respective rooms simultaneously
measure the spins of their particles, in a certain direction; thereafter, at a
second instant, each of the three outside observers performs a measurement
on his room. This measurement is of a “whole-room” observable, like in the
Frauchiger-Renner thought experiment discussed in the previous section. As
a result of the internal measurements by the three friends the whole system
consisting of the rooms and their contents has ended up in an entangled GHZ-
state. Leegwater is able to show that this entails that the assumption that
the standard rules of quantum mechanics apply to each of three differently
chosen sets of simultaneity hyperplanes, gives rise to a GHZ-contradiction:
the different possible measurement outcomes (all +1 or −1) cannot be consis-
tently chosen such that each measurement has the same outcome irrespective
of the simultaneity hyperplane on which it is considered to be situated (and
so that all hyperplanes mesh). As in the original GHZ-argument [19], the
contradiction is algebraic and does not involve the violation of probabilistic
(Bell) inequalities.
One way of responding to these results is the introduction of a preferred
inertial system (a privileged perspective!), corresponding to a state of abso-
lute rest, perhaps defined with respect to an ether. This response is certainly
against the spirit of special relativity, in particular because the macroscopic
predictions of quantum mechanics are such that they make the preferred
frame undetectable. Although this violation of relativistic invariance does not
constitute an inconsistency, it certainly is attractive to investigate whether
there exist other routes to escape the no-go theorems. Now, as we have seen,
a crucial assumption in these theorems is that properties of systems are
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monadic, independent of the presence of other systems and independent of
the hyperplane on which they are considered. This suggests that a transition
to relational or perspectival properties offers an alternative way out.
In fact, that unitary evolution in Minkowski spacetime leads naturally to
a hyperplane dependent account of quantum states if one wants to describe
measurements by effective global collapses has been noted in the literature
before (see e.g. [11, 16, 29]). The new light that we propose to cast on these
and similar results comes from not thinking in terms of collapses, and of a
dependence on hyperplanes or foliations of Minkowski spacetime as such, but
instead of interpreting them as consequences of the perspectival character of
physical properties: that the properties of a system are defined with respect
to other systems. What we take the considerations in the previous and
present sections to suggest is that it makes a difference whether we view the
physical properties of a system from one or another system; or from one or
another temporal stage in the evolution of a system. In the case of the (more
or less) localized systems that figure in the relativistic no-go theorems that
we briefly discussed, this automatically leads to property ascriptions that
are different on the various hyperplanes that are considered. As a result, the
meshing conditions on which the theorems hinge no longer apply.
5 Concluding Remarks
If unitary evolution is accepted as basic in quantum mechanics, and is com-
bined with the requirement that results of experiments are definite and
unique, this naturally leads to a picture in which physical systems have
properties that are relational or perspective dependent. As we have seen
in section 3, perspectivalism makes it possible to escape arguments saying
that interpretations of unitary quantum mechanics in terms of one single
world are not possible. Moreover, perspectivalism removes obstacles to the
possibility of formulating interpretational schemes that respect Lorentz in-
variance by making the introduction of a preferred inertial frame of reference
superfluous (section 4).
The single world that results from perspectivalism is evidently much more
complicated than the world we are used to in classical physics: there are more
than one valid descriptions of what we usually think of as one physical situ-
ation. This reminds of the many-worlds interpretation. There are important
differences, though, between a multiplicity of worlds and the multiplicity
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of descriptions in perspectivalism. According to the single world perspecti-
valism that we have sketched only one of the initially possible results of a
measurement becomes actual from the perspective of the observer, whereas
in the many-worlds interpretation all possibilities are equally realized. So
the multiplication of realities that takes place in many-worlds is avoided in
perspectivalism. It is of course true that perspectivalism sports a multiplicity
of its own, namely of different points of view within a single world. But this
multiplicity seems unavoidable in the many-worlds interpretation as well, in
each individual branch. For example, in the relativistic meshing argument
of Myrvold [28], a situation is discussed in which no measurements occur:
the argument is about two freely evolving localized systems as described
from a number of different inertial frames. Since no measurements are tak-
ing place during the considered process, the inconsistency argument goes
through in exactly the same way in every single branch of the many-worlds
super-universe: there is no splitting during the time interval considered in the
proof of the theorem. So even in the many-worlds interpretation the introduc-
tion of perspectival properties (in each single branch) seems unavoidable in
order to avoid inconsistencies. Another case to be considered is the Wigner’s
friend experiment: when the measurement in the hermetically sealed room
has been performed, an outside observer will still have to work with the su-
perposition of the two branches. So the splitting of worlds assumed by the
many-worlds interpretation must remain confined to the interior of the room,
as mentioned in section 2. In this situation it is natural to make the descrip-
tion of the measurement and its result perspective dependent: for the friend
and his copy inside the room there is a definite outcome, but this is not so for
the external observer. So perspectivalism as a consequence of holding fast to
unitarity and Lorentz invariance seems more basic than the further choice of
interpreting measurements in terms of many worlds; even the many-worlds
interpretation must be committed to perspectivalism. But perspectivalism
on its own is already sufficient to evade the anti single-world arguments of
section 3, so for this purpose we do not need the further assumption of many
worlds.
Finally, the introduction of perspectivalism opens the door to several new
questions. In everyday circumstances we do not notice consequences of per-
spectivalism, so we need an account of how perspectival effects are washed
out in the classical limit. It is to be expected that decoherence plays an
important role here, as alluded to in the Introduction—however, this has to
be further worked out (cf. [3]). Further, there is the question of how the
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different perspectives hang together; for example, in section 3 it was shown
that perspectives of distant observers cannot be simply combined in the case
of entanglement, which may be seen as a non-local aspect of perspectival-
ism. By contrast, it has been suggested in the literature that perspectivalism
makes it possible to give a purely local description of events in situations of
the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type, and several tentative proposals have been
made in order to substantiate this [30, 31, 23, 3, 12]. These and other ques-
tions constitute largely uncharted territory that needs further exploration.
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